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Union Effects: Wages, Turnover, and Job Training
ABS TRACT
This study explores the existence of a net union premium and of the
extent of rationing by quality of the resulting excess supply. The net
union premium was estimated by relating changes inwages to changes in
union status of the same worker in longitudinal panels (NLS and MID), and
by twocross—section wage level regressions, a "prospective't and "retrospective"
which permitmore direct observation of selectivity in hiring. Over a
half of the cross—section differential of over 20% for the "same" (stan-
dardized) worker is a net union rent and much of the rest reflects aquality
adjustment in hiring, as measured by wages. This conclusion was less reliable
for older workers.
Subsequent analysis explores the effects of successful union wage
pressure on: quit rates, fringe benefits, wage profiles, and training.
The reduction in quit of union joiners depends on the size of the
net wage premium. Quit rate differentials are also positively related to
the gross, cross—section wage differentials withingroups of workers,
classified by location and occupation, less so by industry.
In Section 4, it is hypothesized that the imposition of larger fixed
labor costs (such as fringes) helps to deter employers from preferring
reductions in hours to reductions in men, and it helps to stabilize employ-
ment in the face of fluctuating demand, by a more frequent use of overtime
and of temporary layoffs in the union sector. This hypothesis links the
size of fringe benefits to the union wage gain. An analysis of firms in
70 industries confirms this link.
Union pressure is exerted on the whole tenure profile ofwages. The
explicit linking of wage levels to seniority reducesincentives for worker
investmentin general (transferable) training. The total volume of training
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Introduction
Growing numbers of empirical studies confirm the prevalence of the following
features which distinguish unionized from non—unionized labor markets:(1) Higher
wages (2)A larger share of fringe benefits in total compensation (3) Lower quit
rates and lesser turnover, and (4) Flatter age—profiles of wages. These findings
appear to hold both in the aggregate, as when more unionized industries are
compared with less or non-unionized, and in micro-data where a variety of
variables are used to control for personal and, less frequently, firm characteris-
tics which might affect these differences.
Traditionally, economists have been concerned with the relative wage and
much less the employment impact of unionism, just as they have been concerned
with price—quantity impacts of product monopolies. On the other hand, students
of industrial relations tend to emphasize non-wage aspects of unionism in the
work setting. Some time ago (1958) H.G. Lewis dichotomized aspects of unionism
into "monopolistic" and "competitive". In the first category are the imposition
of wages above competitive levels,either by union restriction of supply or by
threats of strikes implicit in collective bargaining. In the second are all those
activities of unions and work rules espoused by unions which need not be in-
consistent with competitive wage—setting. However, these "two faces" of unionism
do not correspond to wage and non—wage aspects of unionism: union induced non—
wage conditions may also impose higher costs on employers, inconsistent with competi-
tion. Conversely,unjon—nonunjon wage differentials need not reflect monopoly rents,
*Thecomments of H. Gregg Lewis have been most helpful. Thanks are due
also to Reuben Oronau. Non Hashimoto, and John Pencavel. Iam grate-
ful to Robert Shakotko for helpful discussions and forthe supply of
data on firms; to Dan Frjedlander for able and conscientiousresearch
assistance; and to Annette Fisch for competent and devoted secretarial
help.—2—
but may be merely compensatory, reflecting a faster and more regimented pace of
work (Duncan and Stafford, 1980) or higher quality of workers in unionized jobs.
The wage—push hypothesis receives almost little or no attention in analyses of other
features of unionized labor markets listed in the first paragraph. Thus with "voice", as a
substitute for "exit", unionized workers quit less frequently than others. With
longer expected stay, the probability of receiving initially non-vested pensions
increases, hence larger pensions (a major part of fringe benefits) are demanded
by union workers. Other explanations of larger union fringes runfromunion
democracywhich favors the older worker to union management of pension funds
as aninstrumentof power. Finally, the flatter union wage profile is seen as
aresult of union egalitarian or bureaucratic compression of thewagestructure.
Although some or all of these hypotheses may be valid, itis possthleto
viewthe union wage pressure as a source, if not necessarily an exclusive one
of all of the features I have enumerated. It is the purpose of the present study
to test this proposition empirically.
1. Union Wage Gains
Before I proceed to explore the effects of union wage pressure on turnover, fringe
benefits, and wage profiles, it is necessary to establish that unions indeed
succeed in pushing their wages above competitive levels. A large literature
(see review by Parsley, 1980) answers this question positively, by observing
a differential in favor of union members after controlling for a large number
of worker personal characteristics in wage level regressions. However, un-
measured differences in labor quality may still be responsible for part or all
of the wage gap. The question is whether, indeed, the same worker, and not
merely his statistical surrogate, receives higher wages in unionthanin non-
union employment.—3—
If the existence of a net union wage gain is confined inthisfashion, we
would expect its size to be smaller than the cross—sectionally observed union
wage differential. This is because above equi1ibrimi wages imply queues on the
supply side which must be rationed.1 Only in the case of probabilistic rationing
("first come, first served") and of rationing byprice(union dues) or by discrimi-
nation and nepotism would the observed net wage gain equalthegross wage diffe-
rential observed in the cross—section. But, employers have incentives to
reduce the increase in labor costs imposed by the union by systematicrationing,
that is by hiring more productive workers from the queue. The increase in labor
costs cannot, however, be completely offset in this fashionpartly because the
marginal cost of screening for quality is positive and because of technological
constraints in the production function. Moreover, where unions have a voice in
hiring, as in the closed shop and in union hiring halls, there are no obvious
incentives for upgrading of labor quality, and rationing is largelyprobabilistic.
Rationing by price (in corrupt unions) or by discrimination and nepotism is out-
lawed, in principle, but its existence cannot be excluded.
The empirical analysis described below relies on observingwages received by
the same worker before and after his change of union status. This approachwas
used most recently by Duncan and Stafford (1980)2and, thus far, most comprehensively
by Wesley Mellow (1981). Duncan and Stafford observed wage changes of a small
sample of union joiners between 1968 ar1971 in theMichigan Panel Survey of
Income Dynamics (MID),andMellow in twoone—yearintervals (1974—75 and 1977—78)
inthe much larger sample of the Current Population Survey (CPS).Largedata
sets, like the CPS sample, are needed to observe adequate numbers of workers
whochange union status, since theirproportionisquite small. An alternative
to usingtheCPSis pooling ofthe longitudinalsamples. Although the annually
surveyed samples in the MID and NLS(NationalLongitudinal Surveys) are much
1Theexistenceof unioninducedqueues has been inferredin aneconometric analysis
ofFarberand Abowd (1981)
Otherreferences are: Brown(1980) ,incan(1979) ,Chamberlain(1978) ,Kenny(1978), and Raisian (1991)—4—
smaller than the CPS,theiradvantage lies in some of the information not available
in the CPS.Especiallyuseful in this context is information on job mobility and
job tenure.
In the work to be described I pooled the MID sample in order to relate annual
changes in wages of white men over the 10—year period 1968—1978 to changes in their
union status. Since the NLS panels contain information on union status in the
years 1969 and 1971,1 Iutilizedthis single interval for the same analysis on the
two NLS panels of young white men (who were 17-27 years old in 1969) and older
white men (who were 48—64 in 1969). The MID contains all ages, but as in the NLS,
I limited the sample to non—students and to a maximum age of 64. For (partial)
comparability with the NLS, I also stratified the MID panel into young (less than
30) and older (30—64) stthsamples.
did not use the less adequate telephone survey of 1970 which also contained
questions on union status.—5.-
Thestatistical analysis relies on wage functions, where the dependent
variable is the logarithm of hourly earnings, and the independent variables
are education (Ed), experience (x)and its square (x2), length of job tenure
(T)and its square (T2), marital status (Mar), health status (Hith), local (Lun)
and national unemployment rate (Nun) .Theseare the "standardizing" variables.
The main focus is on the additional (dmmiy) variables tJij, where i and j index
the first and second period, and have values(0,1), 0 denoting non—union status
and1,union membership. Thus Uoomeans non—union both years, U01 =union
joiner (between the first and second survey), U =unionleaver, and U11 =
unionstayer. These four union status categories were also cross-classified
by mover-stayer status, and for movers by form of separation (quit, layoff)
and whether moved within or between industries.
Wage level equations were used separately for the first and second year
bracketing the changes.1 Both equations contain the same union dtmmies. Thus
in "year 1" equations, the dimimies indicate prospective changes (or continuation)
of union status, while in "year 2" they indicate recent change. Both are useful
in exploring selectivity in hiring. The specification of wage change equations
is derived by taking first-differences of the variables in the level equations.
Thus the experience variable becomes tx= 1for all, and its coefficient enters
the intercept, but x2 differs withthelevel of experience. The tenure variable
T equals 1 for job stayers but becomes negative (—T, where T is length of job
tenure on the preceding job). Correspondingly, T2 is positive for stayers,
but is negative and equals—T2for movers. Standardization for tenure is
important: since wages grow with tenure (exoerience held fixed), wage change
estimates from regressions which omit tenure depend on how long recent movers
stayed on the previous job. Put another way, estimates which omit tenure indicate
the immediate wage change in moving from one job to another, while the present
11n the NIS the firstyear is 1969, the second 1971. in the MID the pairs of
years are adjacent.—6—
specification estimates the wage change from the prior to the current job, at
comparable tenure levels. This is, clearly, a more appropriate measure of returns
to job mobility, or to change in union status.
Although the pooling of ten periods provides an effectively much larger
sampleof the MIDobservations,the smaller NLSsampleis insome respects
superior: fewer observations are lost due to incompleteresponses, and hourly
wagerefers to the current job rather than to the calendar year as in the MID.
The NLSalsocontains an alternative union status definition in addition to
union membership (UN), a question on whether the job is covered by collective
bargaining (CB).
IntheMID, jobandunion status changed between surveys, which weretaken
inthe second quarter of each year. Wage changes, however, refer to calendar
years. Since we bracketed status changers by adjacent years, if the reported
wages are indeed weighted annual figures, they could underestimate the true
change by is much as 33%. We checked on the degree of bias in several periods
(1976, 1977, 1978) when the question on wages was asked for the current job.
The so estimated bias was on average 21%. The bias could be removed by
leaving out two years between "year 1" and "year 2". But this would have
eliminateda large fraction of job changers, whose tenure at moving is
short.—7—
Table 1 shows sample means (i.e. proportions) ofthe union status categories
for the young and old men panels by alternativedefinition of union status in NLS
and in MID. 28.3% of the young men and 36.3% ofthe old men were union members
in 1969. A somewhat larger proportion (33.2%and 39% respectively) were covered
by collective bargainingagreements. Union—nonunj turnoveris quite large
among the young and much smaller amongolder job movers. A surprising and some-
what puzzling statistic is the number of unionstatus changers who do not change
jobs (firms) -—itis as large as the number of union joiners whoare movers
among the young and even larger among the old.The preponderance of stayers who are
union status changers is even stronger inMID, in which the proportion of all
movers appears to be smaller than in the NLS.
1However,(tlM) is, in effect, a subset of(CB),since only thosereporting collectivebargaining coverage were asked whether they are union members.
The (CB) definition is available in MID only for a fewperiods, so it could
not be utilized in the pooled sample.—8—
Table 1
Sam1e Proportions in Union Status Categories
NLSandMID
(A)NLS
YoungMen,n =1160 old Men, n =1588
UN CB UN CB
Movers %
U00 24.321.9 6.5 5.9
U01 4.6 4.9 .8 1.0
U10 4.45.2 .5 .8
U11 I 4.4 5.7 2.6 2.7
Stayers
tJ 38.6 36.0 52.2 49.4
U01 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.7
U10 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.8
U11 18.020.3 3L2 32.7
(B) MID
All, n= 9,987 Age ' 30, n=3,069 Age 30, n=6,905
Movers
Uoo 7.3 13.4 4.6
U01 1.0 2.0 .5
U10 .9 1.8 .5
U,1 1.3 2.0 1.0
Stayers
U00 56.8 53.6 58.3
U01 2.6 2.7 2.5
U10 2.3 2.4 2.3
U,1 27.8 22.1 30.3—9—
Although some stayers may become union members, after a short period in the union
shop, or by switching jobs within the firm, or by the firm becoming unionized,
the figures for job stayers who change union statusappear to be inflated by
misreporting or misclassification. This is especially likely in the MID samples,
where wages of union status changers who are job stayersare about the same
(relative to thebasegroup) before and after the change, (see Table 5)
Table2 presents estimates of the 1969 to 1971 wage changes in the NLS
byunion change category, net of the othervariables(these are showninAppendix
Table Al), classified by mobility status, age, and definition of unionsector
(tJM: union membership, CB: coverage of wage by collective bargainingagreement).
Ntmbers in Table 2are regression coefficients, with t-statjstjcs shown in
parentheses.
Using point estimates and the union membership criterion,young men who
joined unions by changing fixinsgota 17.6% increase in wages, while older men
gained 7.4%. However, by the collective bargaining criterion, the gainwas
similar for young and old (13.5% vs. 11.6%).Thefigures for theoldermen are
barely significant. The wage changes are adjusted for inflation and are net of
the wage change experienced by the base group of non—unionstayers. Firm
stayers who report joining unions show smaller gains, with lesser statistical
significance. Although it may be advisable to discount (or ignore?) the
estimates for stayers, there is still a question whether thefigures for job
movers should be viewed as the net union premium: even if they did not join a
union, young movers between non—union firms (U00) gained 3.5to6.4%.Ifsuch
gains measure the return on costs of mobility, the net profit of joining unions
by moving is reduced to between 7%and14% for the young movers, and is comparable
for the older union joiners although the statisticalreliability oftheestimates
for the older group is much weaker.—10—
Table 2
WageGrowth 1969 to 1971 in the LS
Young Old
ers (tiM) (CB)
U01 17.6 (4.0) 13.5 (3.2) 7.4 (1.5)
tJ10 —26.0 (5.7) —28.7 (6.8) —8.2 ( .6)
U11 (1.8) 7.9 (2.0) 6.9 (1.1)







U01 10.6(2.4) 6.3(1.4) 4.7 ( .4) 6.2(1.3)
U10 —6.6(1.0) —6.3(1.0) 2.6 (.4) 1.6( .3)
tIll 4.0(1.7) 4.3(1.9) 5.2 (2.4) 4.6(2.1)
U00 (Base)—11—
Whenthe movers' separation is distinguished by quit and layoff (see
Table A3, upper panel), the gain from joining a union is about the same
regardless of manner of separation, though for movers within the non-
union sector (TJoo) the gain is a positive 5—6% for quitters and near zero
for those laid—off. These distinctions are not perceptible for the older
union joiners whose sample further divided into quit and layoff becomes
miniscule. However, old non—union movers(U00) experience zero gains in
quitting and significant losses by layoff.
In turn, when movers are distinguished by moves between or within in-
dustry (Table A3, lower panel), (at the 2-digit level), gains to young union
joiners were observed only for inter-industry movers. They are not significant
for within-industry movers, but the latter comprise no more than 20% of
young movers who join unions, Again, no significant differences can be
observed in the small samples of older movers.
Movers who left unions (U10 in Table 2) suffered losses which exceeded
the gains of movers who joined unions. The losses were even greater when the
separation from the union job was by layoff, and when the move was between
industries. Again less confidence should be attached to such findings for
the older men. If thelossof union leavers is to be viewed as another
measureof the union prnius (with a negative sign) ,itis not clear why it is
so much larger than the positive measure. The discrepancy may reflect further
sorting by layoff from union firms, but the basis for such speculation is weak.
Table3presents estimates ofannual wage change equations, pooled over the
period1968 to 1978 in the MID. Only one definition of union status(union
membership)is available for all theyears.The findings, coefficients of union
dusm'ies, are shown for all ages and for the two age groups, below age 30, and
30—64, separately.Table 3
-12-
Annual Wage Growth1968 -1978,MID, oo1ed
Movers All Age < 30 Age30
U01















Uoo 4.3(3.2) 7.0(3.6) .7( .4)
Stayers
















Young men who join the union by changing firmsgainabout 13% in wages;
the cider men's gain of 4% is not statistically significant. The average
gain for all is 9%. This reduces to 6% for the young and less than 5% for
all, if the union premium is viewed as net of the return to mobility into a
non-union job. However, when the moves of union joiners are classified by quit
and by layoff, (Table A4, upper panel), the gain by quitting was significantly
larger: 19.8% for the younger and 11.8% for the older group. The non—union
quitters had gains of 12.4% and 4.6% respectively. A net premium which would
take into account the returns to mobility makes the net differential about 7%
for quitters in both age groups. Again, as in the NLS,thegain for union
joiners who are movers shows up in inter-industry mobility.
Compared to the NLS,MIDestimates of the average union premium appear to
besomewhat smaller.1A major difference is in the estimate of losses of union
leavers:they are larger than thegainsofjoiners in the NLS, but insignificant
inMID. However, theinsignificance in the MID sample atpiies only to the young
group.among those over 30, union leavers who quit gain 12% while those laid
off lose 8.6%. No significant wage changes are observed for persons who did
not change jobs. Reported changes of unionstatus in this grouparemore
questionablethan in the NLS sample.
To sinarize the findings in both the NLSandMID:(1) Estimates of wage changes
of union joiners are near 15% for young (<30) white men and 4—12% for older men. If
gains from (non-union)mobilityare subtracted fromtheseestimates, the net union
premiumisreduced to between 6—14% for the young joiners.
(2)The union premium apearstobe larger for theyoung than
forthe older men. This is not true if collective bargaining rather than union
membership is a criterion (in the NLS). Ncr is it true in MID if union joiners
quit from the preceding job.
1Recall (p.6, above) that MIDestimatesof wage changes tend to be understated.—14—
(3) The union premium is clear and significant mainly if union joiners
quit the preceding job and moved between (2-digit) industries, as 80% of them did.
(4) Unionleavers lose morethan i.mion joiners gain in the NLS. In
theMIDsample, only union leavers over 30 who were laid off lose as much or more than
joiners gain. There is no evidence of losses for the younger union leavers.
2. Cross—Section Differentials and Selectivity in Hiring
Tables 4 (for NLS) and S (for MID) present coefficients on union status
dummies in two crdss—section wage regressions, year 1, prior to the change in
union status, and year 2 after the change.Thus for job movers the coefficient on U1 in
th&'prospective"regression (year 1) estimates the wage of prospective movers from
non—union to union jobs (e.g. a coefficient of 1.2means1.2% points larger than
the wage of the base group =nonunionstayers). The coefficient of U01 in the
"retrospective"regression (year 2) estimates the wage on the new union job of
these recent union joiners, again relative to the base group in year 2,
If the existence of a union premium induces employers to select more pro—
ductive labor, we would expect prospective union joiners to havehigherwages in
the prior, nonunion job than other nonunion workers. We have to be careful,
however, to compare wages of new hires into union jobs with wages of new hires
into non-union jobs: employers select among new hires. Thus the difference
between the coefficients of U01 and U00 of job movers in the prospective regression
(year 1) measures the upgrading in hiring into union jobs. Although
union joiners had a prior non—union wage about the same as the base group of non-
union stayers, their wages were significantly higher (about 10%) than the prior
non—union wage of new hires into non—union jobs. This selectivity differential
appears to be similar for the young and old NLS samoles and is roughly comparable
insize (a bitsmaller) to the net union premium estimated from














































(UN) (CB) (UN) (CB)
1.2( .3) -2.6( .6) -3.4(.2) -4.5(.7)
20.8(4.6) 20.7(4.9) 3.1(.2) —2.9(1.0)
33.3(7.4) 27.2(6.6) 42.9(6.1) 43.7(6.4)
—9.7(4.0) —10.2(4.0) —11.6(2.6) —11.0(2.3)
6.1(1.3) 7.2(1.5) —9.8(1.8) —9.4(1.8)
11.7(1.6) 6.9(1.0) —6,4(.8) —6.3(1.0)





























Wage level estimates, MID- Pooled




10 —8.6(2.3) 2.2( .5) —17.2(3.0)
T3ii 17.6(5.6) 21.5(4.4) 13.7(3.2)
13 16.O(11.3) —14.1(75) —15.2(7.2)
Stayers
01 3.5(2.3) 10.4(2.6) . 2.7( .9)
10 3.5(1.6) 4.4(1.2) 3.1(1.1)





01 —1.4( .4) 1.3.2(2.8) —10.5(1.8)
1310 —4.7(1.1) 1.0( .2) —2.6(.4)
11 26.1(7.4) 32.7(6.2) 23.7(5.7)
00 14.2(8.9) 4.9(2.0) 15.2(6.5)—17—
Thecomparison of coefficients on and U of MD movers (Table 5)in
year 1 yields theconclusionthat workers newly hiredintounion jobs had, on
average, higher wages on the preceding job in the non-union sector than non-
union workers hired into non—union jobs. The difference is smaller in the
Michigan Panel than it was in the NLS.3utthis is a result of twoopposite
differentials by age. The young workers hired into union jobs had 8% higher
wagesthan the prospective non—union hires, a figure cormarab1e to the selec-
tivity differential estimated for young NLS workers. However, the older group
of newhires (30+) hadlower wages thanthe comparisongroup of non—union hires.
Inspection of year 2 wages of new hires in their new jobsshows that the
wage differential between non—union workers (in year 1)who moved to unionand
non—unionjobs respectively (in year 2) has just about doubled(roughly from 10to
20%)between year 1 and year 2 in both NLSand MID samplesof young workers.
Thusthe union—nonunion differentials (among new hires in year 2) reflect
selectivity in hiring and, a net union wage premin in about equalmeasure.
Forthe older worker the results are mixed: In the NLS the union-nonunion
differential among new hires (year 2) more than doubledcompared to year 1,
while in the MID the differential changed from negative inyear 1 to positive
in year 2.
A sharper view of these comparisons is shown in Table 6. A
little arithmetic is helpful in inspecting the table. First,
it is clear that the increment in thewage differential between union and
non—unionnew hires from year 1 (on the old jobs,both non—union) toyear2
(onthe new jobs, one union, the other non—union) is in principle,1 ecuivajent










Inpractice,the estimates differ largely because of a differing structure































Yoing 18.]. 7.9 10.2 5.9
Older 4.7 —9.0 13.7 3.3




The are the regression coefficients on the respective union dummies U3.
The firsttermon the left hand side is the cross—sectional union—nonunion wage
differential for new hires, the second term measures upgrading in union hiring,
andthe right hand term is the implicit union wage premium -
withreturns on costs of mobility netted out.
The interpretation expressed on the left handsideof (1) justifies the use
ofthe second term on the right hand side: Emphasis on new hires coming from the non-
union sector; where wages may be assumed to reflect the marginal value product,
justifies the netting out of returns to mobility of workers moving within the
non—union sector only.
Column(l) of Table 6 shows the cross—section union non-union differential
for new hires. Column (2) shows the selectivity (upgrading) differential, which
is a component of the union—nonunion wage gap (1). Column (3) is the difference
between (1) and (2), the implicit net union wage premium obtained by new hires.
For comparison, Column (4) shows the net union wage premium estimated from the
wage—changeregressions, and Column (5), the cross—section union—nonunion wage
differential among stayers (coefficients of U11 of stayers in year 2) ,which
comes closest to the usual regression estimates of the union—nonunion differential
inthe cross—section.
Judging by the first two columns of Table 6, selectivity in hiring, as measured
by prior wages, accounts for almost one half of the union-nonunion wage differential
among young new hires in the IlLS, but less in the MID. The time-series estimates of
the net wage premium (col. 4) are comparable to the implicit cross-section estimates
(col. 3) in NLS, but they are smaller in the MID. For the older group in MID,
selectivity into the union (ccl. 2) appears to be perverse, that is negative.—20--
The analysis sunnnarized in Table 6 contains several innovations:(1) It
relies on estimates of wage changes of workers whose union statuschangesas they move
betweenfirms. This is because reports of changes in union statuswhile staying in
thefirmappear to be less reliable and show small or no effects. Previous studies
which do not contain information on job mobility, therefore, probably attenuate the
effects of unions on wages.(2) Information on mobility also permits more direct
estimates of selectivity in hiring, as shown in col. 2 of Table 6.(3) Firlly,
the information on tenure makes possible estimates of gains from mobility as upward
shifts of the whole tenure profile of wages from the old to the new job.Usually
observed instantaneous wage changes may be negative, as is often found, but the
1
longer run effects obtained in the present analysis are more likely to be positive.
As to ninerical results, it appears that estimates of net union gains in wages,
as seen in new hires, range from 7 to 15% in the NLS and from 3 to 14% in the MID.
Since the latter is biased downward, upward adjustments would put the central tendency
of both NIS and MID a little over 10%. Selectivity accounts for almost as much in
the NLS and the young workers in MID, but not so in the over 30 group in MID.
1
Even though superior as measures of gains from mobility, the shifts in tenure
wage profiles are not fully commensurate with gains in present values. It
can be shown that in order to secure the same gain in the present value of wages,
moves after longer tenure require a larger shift in the tenure profile on the
new job. This was confirmed empirically by positive and significant coefficients
on a job change x prior tenure interaction variable in the wage change estimates
(nct included in the present study).-21—
3.. Turnover inUnionEmployment
If the wage received in union employment exceeds the worker's opportunity
wage in non—union employment, he is less likely to quit a union job than a non-
unionjob.
As Table 7 indicates, quit rates in the union sector are about half as large
as in the non—union sector for young workers and are about one third as large
for men over 30 (in MID), and one seventh for men over 48 (in NLS) The differences
are smaller for separations, since layoffs are somewhat larger in the union, at
least in the NLS.
Although one third of the white male workers are unionized (somewhat less
among the young), less than 10% of non-unionized job seekers find employment
in the union sector, while a half of the 9oung and two—thirds of the older unionized
job movers find employment in the union sector. Since these statistics apply
to "unstandardized" workers, they may reflect differences in tastes and in
geography, industry, and occupation. At face value, at any rate, the differences
are consistent with our findings: non-union workers could get a bigger wage g.n
by moving to union jobs, but are evidently prevented by fewer vacancies and non—
probabilistic rationing (stricter hiring standards, nepotism, etc.) resulting from
the wage premium in the union sector. Union workers, however, can gain from mobility
within the union sector, but face a wage loss when they leave the union sector.
(Tables 2 and 3 above). Thus they tend not to leave the firm unless there is a
1
good chance of landing another union job.
11f the existence of grievanceprocedures ("voice" instead of "exit") were
the major force that ties groups of workers with similarpreferences to a
rirm, we would expect lesser quit from firmswithsuch labor relations.
But, in the absence of a wage remium in unionized firms, thosewho senarate
rrom sucn zrms would be 1arely indifferent whether they movedto a union
or non—union firm, It is, incidentally, not clear whygrievance crocedures
cannot exst need be or less effective in non-unionizedfirms, if reduction
ln turnover reduces labor costs.—22—
Table 7
Turnover Rates ( % ),byUnion Status and Age
(a) Quits Young Old Age30 Age30
NU 26.7 6.5 14.6 4.7
U 14.3 .9 7.5 1.7
(b) Layoffs
NU 13.5 5.0 7.0 3.0
U 17.7 7.0 6.6 2.7
(C)Separation
NU 40.2 11.5 21.6 7.7
U 32.0 7.9 14.1 4.4—23—
Ifunionization reduces job mobility, this rEduction should be observed
on the same individual by comparing his mobility before and after joining a
union firm. And if the wage premium gained by moving to a union firm matters,
the reduction in mobility should be greater the greater the wage gain.
According to Table 9, young NLS men who joined unions between 1969 and 1971 iai,e
prior quit frequency (in 1967—1969) which was not smaller than the quit of other non—
unionized workers at that time.1 This is based on regressions with quit as a
dependent variable (0,1) and 1969 values of the same standardizing variables
as used in the wage level regressions. However, the frequency of quit was
lower by about 13% points in 1971-1973 after joining a union (coefficient of
U01)inthe interval 1969—1971, This reduction is aslargeas the unstandardized
cross—sectiondifference in Table 7. In 1971—1973 union stayers CU11 in 1969—71)
hadaboutthe samelowquit rates asunionjoiners.2
No significant results were obtained for the older NLS men who joined
unions,but union stayers had significantly lower quit rates than non-union
workers both in 1967—1969 and in 1971—1973.
1For a similar finding, based on other data, see Freeman (1980)
2Recall that union status was not reported in 1967, somany of the young
union stayers in 1969—71 were likely to have beenjoiners in1967—69.—24--
TableB
Quits and Layoffs, Before and After
Change in Union Status, NLS
1967—69 1971—73
Quits Young Old Young Old
U01 —1.8 ( .9) +.9( .4) —12.7 (2.8) —1.1 (.5)
U10 2.9 ( .6) —.8( .2) —4.9 ( .9) —2.3 ( .8)
—4.4 (1.5) —2.2 (1.7) —16.4 (5.2) —2.7 (2.7)
Layoffs
U01 6.0 (1.2) 3.4 (1.1) 10.3 (2.7) —1.0 ( .4)
U1 16.5 (3.2) 7.8 (1.8) 4.8 (1.1) 3.6 (.9)
1311 —9.4 (3.3) —.7( .5) 4.1 (1.6) 2.6 (1.9)A comparable analysis was performed on the full D Sample(including
movers and stayers) using all ages and changes in quit ( Q) as the dependent
variable which assntes values (--1, 0, +1).Againthe standardizing variables
were the same as in the1n wage equations, The results are shown in col. (1)
of Table 9.
Union joiners experienced significant reductions in quit rates compared
to all other groups. Larger wage gains (for all movers and stayers) alsore—
duced quits in the next period. Here we do not distinguishwage gains of union
joiners from those of everyone else.
To observe this distinction we restricted the sample to job movers (about
two—thirdsof the sample had at least one move during the 10—year panel period),
Weconstructed a mobility index CM), which is a count of numbers of firmsin
which the person worked up to the current job (i.e. number of separations + 1)
divided by the time interval over which mobility was recorded. The denominator
of the index is the interval since entry into the labor force, or since1958,
if entry into the labor force was before this date.Wage changes associated
with job moves were recorded separately for union joiners and for others
between 1968 and 1973, and their effects estimated on the change in M (and
in ln M) between the move and 1973, the last year of the panel.
Thenumeratorof the mobility rate includespermanent layoffs in addition
to quits, but is dominated by quits,We could not restrict the indexto quits,
since the pre-l968 mobility isreported as separationsHowever, as Table8showed,
although (permanent) layoffs are somewhatlarger in the union sector in theNLS,
they are not larger in the MID sample,But, even in the NLSdifferencesin
separations are dominated by differencesin quits,—26—
Table 9
Changes in QuitRelatedto Changes in Union Status and in Wages
(MID)
Changes in Quits Changes in Mobility Rates
(Full Sample) (Sample restricted to movers prior to 1974)
4 inN




U,1 1.2 (1.3) lnW00
—.05(1.7) —.07(1.6)
1nW —4.9 (3.4)—27.-
Apreliminary cross-section analysis (Table AS, panel (a)) showed that the
mobility rate (N and inN) declines with experience in a decelerating fashion, is
reduced by education, marital status, union status, and by economy wide unemploy—
ment.
The dependent variable (AM, or inN) in col. 2 and 3 of Table 9 is the
difference between the index in 1978 and the first move observed between 1968
and 1973 (inclusive) for non-union people (for most of them this was not the
first move,since they moved also before 1968) or the move at which they joined
a union. The union dummy U01 distinguishes union joiners from non—union movers
and wage gains of joiners ( mW01) are distinguished from wage gain of non--
unionmovers •Thestandardizing variables are in the form of differences between
1978 and levels at the time of the move, Dumtijes were added toaccountfor
entry into the labor force before 1968, and 1958, andyears observed in the
panel.
Theresults show that union joiners reduce their mobility morethe larger
thewage gain from joining a union. A similar,but much smaller,and barely
significant, effect is observed for wage gains of movers in the sector.
This is true whether the index or the changes in wages are logarithmic or
arithxnetjca 1.
The weak effect of an episode of mobility among non—union jobs is not
surprising: unless the rate of return on the cost of moving is unusually high,
there are no disincentives to future job search, However, the larger the
wage premium for union joiners the greater the potential loss from future
mobility. This reasoning applies more clearly to quitbehavior,but the
effects on total separations, if weaker, are similar.—28—
Whethermere unionization without a wage premiimi produces a reduction in
mobility is not as clear in Table 9. The union dtmuny has a strong effect on
the change in the logarithmic, but not arithmetical, mobility index. It is
also strong in Ccl. (1) where the wage gain of union joiners was not separated from
others. Undoubtedly it represents a response to other unionbenefits,in fringes and
in working conditions, including the more certain advantages of seniority.
Nevertheless, our findings support the inference that the union wage gain is not
merely a compensatory differential for quality of labor, or costs of mobility, or for
inferior conditions in union jobs. Union rents appear to be real, although
relatively small (closer to 10% than to 20%).
Although cross—section union—nonunion wage differentials (gross) over-
statethesize of the (net) union premium, it may be useful to explore their
effects on differentialsin quit rates in the cross—section, on the asstnption
that thegross and net wage differentials are positively correlated. Again
the purpose is to findout whether it isnot merely union—status but the size
ofthe differential that affects mobility.
Thecompanionanalysis whose reults are shown in Table 10 exploits the
large size of the MIDpanelinanother way: we explore whether union—nonunion
wage differentials affect quit rateswithin ,alternatively,industries,
regions (states), and occupations. The analysis proceeds in two steps:first
weadded industry (or state, or occupation) ,union,and industry x union membership
dimsnies to the cross—section wage function. The coefficients of the cross-product
dummies (ftj)areestimates of within-group union—nonunion (relative) wage
differentials (estimates shown in Table A6). In the second step we included industry
(or other groups), and a union dummy as well as its cross—product with the estimated





Industry —.032 (3.5) .002 ( .1)
State —.024 (3.0) —.080 (1.8)
Occupation —.002 C .2) —.21 (4.1)
*Listedin Table A6.-30—
Weruled out groups
for which we had too few (less than 20) observations intheunion or nonunion
sector. Thus we utilized 22 industries, 31 states, and 27 occupational
categories (Table A6).
The intra—group union—nonunion wage differentials 3. amounted, on average,
to 15—20%. They ranged from 0 to over 40% and were most prominent (larger and
more significant) in the occupational category, less so within states, and
least within industries.
Table 10 which reports the results of step 2, shows respectively the effects
of union status (U), and of wage differentials (2)
on differencesin quitrates between unionized and non—unionized workers within
thevariousgroups of workers. Effects of wage differentials are not significant
within industries ( at a level higher than 1-digit, for workers with the same
measiired characteristics ,butthey are significant within regions and occupations.
Unionstatus alone (the U dummy) is sufficient to affect theintra—iridustry differences,
but plays no role other than via wage differentials inside occupations. Both
variables are significant within states. Note also that U is significant in all three
groups, when/3 is dropped, and conversely.—31.-
4. Fringe Benefits and Hours of Work
If numbers employed (N) and hours per worker (H) are viewed as separate
factors of production, cost minimizing employers will determine their demand for
N and H at the point where the ratio of marginal factor costs is equal to the
ratio of marginal productivities, that is to the solpe of the optimal production
isoquant.




whereF is the fixed cost of employment per worker, amortized per period by r,
the interest cost of capital and by q, the worker quit probability which depreciates
the capital sum creating a capital loss Fq per period.
To the extent that F is positive an increase in the wage rate W reduces the
factor cost ratio shifting the relative demand away from hours toward numbers.2
In the minimum wage case it may be argued that F is significant at most in terms
oftrainingexpenses, but that minimum wages tend to reduce or eliminate such
expenses, so that the predicted effects on hours may be observed only in the
short run before the adjustment is coinpleted,or it may be indeterminate.
1Lettotal labor costs be C=NHW+ NP (r+q),Then MC =dC=EW+F (r-4-a)
dN
and MCH = =
dH
analysis of substitution beeen H and N ignores scale effects. The
qualitativeconclusions,however, remainvalid so long asthe elasticity
ofdemand for numbers (N) with respect to wages (including fringes) is
less than unitary.—32—
In contrast to the minimum wage, union
pressure on wages extends to most components of the wage package.
Indeed, union push on components otherthandirectly paid out wages appear to
be even stronger. Union fringe benefits exceed non-union benefits not only
in dollar value but also as a proportion of the wage package (about 30%). A
number of possible explanations have been conjectured, running from union demo—
crasywhich favors the older worker to union management of pension funds as an
instrument of power. One economic argument relies on reduced turnover, which
is a result of union wage push and of other gains. In the presence of in-
complete vesting of pensions in the worker, longer tenure of union members
means that the probability of ultimately receiving the pension is higher in
1 unionthan in non—union jobs. Hence the incentive to push for larger pensions
(Freeman, 1978). But why increase fringe benefits by a larger percentage than
the increase in the paid out wage? One reason is the higher marginal income
tax rate, if the income elasticity of worker demand for fringes is otherwise
unitary(Rice, 1966). But this may explain only a small part oftheproportional
2
increase(Donsimoni and Shakotko, 1979).
The analysis of effects of wage push on hours may provide one rationale for
union pressure on fringes: an increase in union wages W, with F unchanged, would
lower the ratio, of marginal factor costs both by raising the denominator in the
second righthandcomponent of equation (1) and by reducing q in the numerator.
Ifhours are reduced, weekly earnings may not increasemuch even if wage rates
rise significantly. To blunt the adverse effect on hours, more specifically, to
prevent theirreductionwhich would limit union gains in earnings, quasi-fixed
costs,such asfringes, must be increased by a larger percentage than the paid
out wage (W),sincequits(q)declinewhen both W and F areincreased.
1For the same reasons, more vesting is less costly to union than non-unionemployers.
2They found that fringe benefitswere substantially larger for union workers whose
total compensation (wages +fringe)was the same as the total compensation of
non—union workers.—33—
Incontrast to hypotheses which rely on non-wage aspects of unionism to
explainthe larger ratio of fringe benefits to paid out wages in union employ-
ment, this analysis predicts a positive link between the percent union wage
premium and the relative increase in fringe benefits (F). Moreover, the per-
cent increase in F is expected to exceed the percent increase
in the wage, since the larger the latter, the bigger is the decrease in the
quitrate.Thus unions which achieve the biggest gain in paid out wages would
also want the largest proportion of their total compensation in fringe benefits.
This proposition is tested on a sample of over 4,000 firms in 70 (2.-digit)
industries. Average paid out wages in union firms were 21% higher than in non-
union firmswithinthe industry (a simple average of 70 wage ratios), while
average fringe benefits were 60% higher. The first regression (t.able II, Panel A)
relates the ratios of fringes ,whereu is union, n is nonunion, and i is
Fni i
industry to ratios of money wages,standardizing for age of employees, size of
firm,geographicregion, and union coverage of the industry.
As predicted, the coefficient on the wage ratio in Table 11 is significantly
larger than unity (1.62). This implies that a 10% increasein the union wage
premiumwould create a 16% increase in the union—nonunion ratio of fringe benefits.
This ratio was, on average, 32% in the unstandardized data.
A secondtestwas performed,atthe firmlevelon union firms alone. First
awage and fringefunction was estimated on non—union firmsinorder to impute
non-union levels of wagesandfrires to unionfirms. Thusthe denominators of
the wage ratio and the fringe ratio. ire imputedvalueswhich workers in union
firmswouldreceive if theywerenot unionized. This is a more stringent test
because it relates fringes to wages in union firms only, and becauseerrors in
imputationbias thecoefficients against the hypotheses (downward) .Theresults
(Table 11, Panel B) nevertheless. are once again as predicted, although the co-
efficient on the wage—ratio is, indeed, smaller than in Panel A.(A) IndustryLevel-—Panel A
Table 11
(B) Firm Level——Panel B
—34—












































































OLD 0.0052 0.9 Yl 0.0150 0.6
COVER 0.3413 1.8 INTERCT -0.4607 —1.4
INTERCT —0.9640 —1.7












DependentVariable: F-BRAT, union/non-union fringe benefit ratio.
Independent Variables:
INDUSY-LEVEL REESSIQNS:Panel (A)
MWRAT -—union/nonunionmoney wage ratio
SIZE ——size of establishments measured by the logarithm of the total
numberof employees, industry average. Source: a.
SOUTH --proportion of establishments in the south. Source: a
URBAN -—proportion of establishments in urban areas. Source: a.
Yl,Y2 ——proportion of firms surveyed in 1967-1968 wave and 1969-1970
wave respectively. Reference group was 1971-1972 wave. Source: a.
OLD -—industry average of the proportion of workers over age 50.
Source: a.
C0V ——proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements.
Note: the industry definition for this variable is slightly
different from the industry definition used in the main
part of the study, but no industries are more broadly
defined in the C0V variable. Source: c.
FIRM-LEVEL REGRESSIONS: Panel(B)
COV ——see above.
C4 ---Four-firm sellers' concentration. Weighted sum of 4—digit level
concentration figures with value of shipment used as weight, and
raw data corrected to account for regional and natiorl markets.
Source: b.
EDUCATION -—average years of education of blue—collar workers. Source: b.
MALE -—proportion of male blue—collar workers. Source: b.
URBAN -—dummy, 1 if firm isin an urban area. Source: a.
SOUTH -—dummy, 1if firmis in the south. Source: a.
SIZE ——see above, log of number of employees in firm. Source: a.-34b.
Firm—level regressions cont.
YOUNG -—percentage of firmemployeesunder age 35. Source: b.
OLD -—percentage of firm employees over age 40.Source: b.
Yl,Y2 -—see above, dummy form.Source:a.
Source aExpenditures for Employee Compensation. Three surveys
conductedby the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1968, 1970,
and 1972 have been pooled. They include 4,073 establishments,
2,580 unionized and 1,493 nonunionized.
b MayCurrentPopulation Survey.Three surveys conduced
1973,1974, and 1975 have been pooled. They include
50,000 households with 49 percent of union members.
cP.ichard FreemanandJames Medoff. "New Estimates of the
Thdustrial Unionism in the U.S." Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, January 1979, 143—174.—35—
Inthe data analyzed in Table 11 the value of union fringes is 80% higher than
of nonunion fringes, while wages are 30% higher. Asuxning t1 t the net union effect
is a half of this figure (i.e. 15%) ,andthat quit rates are half as large in the
nonunion sector (as observed in Table 7), we can calculate the required ratio of
fixed costs which would remove employer incentives to cut hours schedules
of union workers. Given N (numbers employed), the condition is, by eg. (1)
F(r+q) F (r +
w w u
Assuming r =10%,and =10%, = =115 4— 153
Fn W(r+q) X-
Theactual ratio of fringe benefits is larger (1.80) ,presmiablybecause fringes
represent only a part, although a major one, of fixad labor costs.
An important consequence of higher fixed costs (in hiring and in fringes)
imposed on union employers is greater stability of employment——reduced
fluctuations in N, when labor demand fluctuates (see Rosen, 1968). As a
result, the major means of adjustment to fuictuating demand in union employment
are the use of overtime when labor is short and the use of temporary layoffs (recall
unemployment) in slack times. Temporary layoff is favored by union workers, as it
implies lesser income loss than corresponding reductions in weekly hours, because
of unemployment compensation and other unemployment benefits (see b). For their
part, employers can expect less attrition, since temporarily laid off union
workers are less likely to look for other jobs than comparable non—union workers.
Theevidence that average weekly hoursare not less in the union than non—union
sector,that overtime is more prominent aridthat temporary layoffs are more frequent
anda larger porportion of total layoffs in the union sector is available1, and con-
sistent with our hypothesis. In this light union pressure on fringe benefits is not
merely (or at all) a tradeoff for higher wages, but a policy which increases both
earningsand job securityof union workers,
1IrxMID, straight-time in weekly hours are about 4% shorter in union jobs, but
total hours are rio less in union than in nonunion jobs. See also Blau and Kahn
(1981) ,andRaisian (1981) .5. Union Wage Profiles and Job Training
Thecross—section union-nonunion differentials in wages diminish with
age.They are reduced from over 22% to about 15% between ages less than and more
than 30 for union stayers (U11) in MID (Table 5), and reduced further to a little
over zero for those over 48 in NLS (Table 4). The implication is that the typical
union age (experience) wage profile,although higher in level is flatter than the
typicalnon—union profile. This difference has been found inotherstudies and
hasbeen ascribed to union policy of compressing wage differentials across firms
and workers, who may differ in sex, education, race, and age.
The policy of wage compression has been attrthuted to union pursuit of
equity, to administrative convenience in collective bargaining, and to union
effortsto reduce competition from lower wage firms. However, a more direct
explanation of flatter wage profiles involves union emphasis on wage progression
by seniority rules: Within the firm,thewage structure and other rules•ofcollec-
tive bargainingagreements are specified in terms of seniority, or job tenure.
Although wages grow as tenure lengthensin non—union jobs as well
as in union jobs (Table 12) ,theexplicit seniority rules in union
firms are a great dealmore rigid: Seniority is the necessary condition for
promotion in most union firms.Ifthe higher job level requiresadditionaltraining,
unionclauses often provide that senioremployees are to be trained in order
1
to fill the higher level vacancies.Such provisions limit the supply of trained
workers from the outside. At the same time they severely reduce the benefits from
transferable training. Consequently, incentives for general (transferable)
training are reduced for union workers, both because such training is not
adequately rewarded within the union firm, and because union workers are less
likely to move in the first place.
1See ELS Bulletin, TtUnion Status and Benefitsof Retirees", July 1973.—37—
Table 12





























(A) Wage Level (mW)
Union Nonunion
(B) Wage Growth (mW)
5.0 (22.4)9.6 (46.4)
l.7 (10.6)3.7 (21.2)
-0.2 ( 7.4) -0.6 (17.9);




.4 C.2)13.1 ( 7.1)
—7.3 C 4.4) —12.7 C 6.1)
1.2 ( 6.1)2.7 (11.1)
-.8 (.9) -5.5 (5.1)—38—
This helps to explain the declining with age proportion of job movers who
join union firms(Table1), and the smaller coefficient of experience1
at fixed levels, in the wage function of union compared to non—union workers
(Table 12)
Whatever training exists in unionfirms, andcertainly some initial
(apprentice) training exists in crafts, and is provided for the purposes of
filling more skilled vacancies from within, almost by definition, all of it is specific
to the firm.Ifwage growthwithtenure at fixed levels of experience reflects
thegrowth of specific capital, tenure—wage profiles in union firms need not be
flatter and mayevenbe steeper than in non—union firms.
This is, indeed, found in Table 12, where thecoefficienton tenure in
the union wage equation is no smaller than in the non-union equation. Table 12
is restricted to MIDdatabecause estimates of experience and tenure coefficients in NLS
are sensitive to truncation byage.The non—union tenure coefficient in the wage
level equation (left—hand panel) is smaller in col. (3),where an attemptwas
made to adjust the estimate for heterogenity bias2by introducing the (prior)
mobility rate variable. This variable (M) has a negative and significant effect in the
non-union equation, where italsoreduces the tenurecoefficient,but has no effect
in theunion equation. The right-hand panel of the Table shows separate wage
growth equations for union andnonunion workers. Thecomparativeresults are
similarto the results in wage levels, but all coefficients are smaller and
less significant.
1And of education, if job training is complementary.
2
For an introduction of this approach, see Mincer and Jovanovic (1978)—39—
The experience coefficient is much smaller in the union equation. Thus
the flatness of gross union wage profiles (by age, or experience) when tenure
is ignored, or by tenure when experience (or age) is ignored is due solely to
lesser worker investments in general training.
Theflatter gross union profile also suggests that the total volume of train-
ingis smallerinunionfirms. Inprinciple,this need not bethecase, since the
wageprofile measures returns to workers, but not returns on costs
borne by employers. The reluctance of union workers to quit should provide
incentives for union employers to invest in specific training of their workers,
since the risk of a capital loss by worker quit is smaller. Union workers have
a corresponding insurance against capital losses only to the extent that seniority
rules reduce layoffs .This is true at higher levels of seniority at the expense
of low—tenured workers. Thus, in contrast to the usual (competitive) analysis
(Becker,1975) whereworker turnover -bothquitsandlayoffs -area result of
investments in specific hi.nan capital shared by workers and employers, such
investments are the result, rather than cause, of turnover patterns induced
byunion pressure.
Becauseof lower quit,wemight expect employer investments in specific
training of union workers to exceed thecorrespondinginvestments of non—union
employers. But the fact that permanent layoff rates of union workers are no
smaller than in the non—union sector raises doubtsaboutsuch expectations.
However, higher rates of union layoffs concentrated at low tenure levels may
both reflect additional screening of new hires and may be a substitute form
of adjustment for reduced quit)If thevolimte of specific training is not
clearly larger in union firms,totaltraining,including the general component,
islikely to be smaller. This is apparently confirmed by the more direct
evidence on reported training, to which we proceed:
1Blauand Kahn find that unionismiñreases permanentlayoffs among the your,
not among the old NLS. Our own research (not presented here) shows that while
quits and layoffs decline with tenure at about the same rate for non—union workers,
layoffsdeclinemore steeply thap quits for union workers.—40—
In the NLS,training was reported in response to questions: Do you receive or
use additional training (otherthanschool training) on yourjob?In MID,
different questions were used in different surveys; the most appropriate for
our purposes is the question asked in 1976—1978: "Are you learning skills on
the current job which could lead to a better job or to promotion?"
In a recent paper (Mincer and Leighton, 1981) these questions were used
to explore the effects of minimum wage laws on training on the job. Training
so reported was used as a dependent variable1 in the NLS and MID equations
(the same set of independent variables was used as in the wage equations)
A union dtnmyincludedin those equations was significantly negative in all
periods in the MID and in the older NLSsample.
In the current study, we further classified the union status variable
asjoiners (U01),leavers (U), and stayers (U11), and explored the incidence
oftrainingbefore and after the change of union status.
In the LS samDles(Table 13,(A) ) the old unionstayersand union joiners
showsignificantly less training than non—union stayers. The signs on coefficients
of the young union joiners are negative, not significant before joining and almost
significant after, Old union leavers show positive, but not significant coefficients.
The MID results (Table 13(B) ) similarly show significantly less training
among union stayers (U11). They also show that less training is required on union
jobs, though not as a precondition for hiring (coefficient U1 is not significant
in year 1, Panel C). The coefficients of union joiners are negative and riot signi-
ficant before but significant after joining the union (year 1 and year 2 regressions).
Infereritielly, they received more training than union stayers before the start of the
union job. Conversely, union leavers appear to receive more training than before
on the non-union job to which they moved.
lAsan independentvariable, the trathirig dumnies are positve and significant
in both wage level and wage growth equations (not reported here).—41—
Table 13
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Thefindings on workers who changed union status are not very sQcure, but
they suggest that selectivity in hiring msy involve prior training (in addition
to some cencentration of it at the outset of some of the union jobs, such as in
crafts). This may explain the results for the very young NLSworkerswhere
union effects on training were not significant.
The finding that union workers receive less training on the job than non-
union workers is also confirmed in the Michigan Time Study, as reported by
Duncan and Stafford (1980). They report that while non-union work s spend,
on average 6.1 hours per week on job training, comparable union workers spend
4.2 weekly hours on such trainirj.
Summary
Amourig anumber of features that distinguish unionized from non-unionized
labor markets, at least four have been repeatedly observed in empirical studies:
(1) Higher wages, (2) Larger fringes, more than in proportion to wages, (3) Lesser
turnover,reflecting lesser quit,though not lesslayoffs, and (4)Flatter age—
wageprofiles. Although the labor monopoly hypothesis has been used (and disputed)
as an explanation of higher union wages, it does not receive much, if any,
attention in analyses of the other features.
This study explores the existence of a net union premium and of the extent
of rationing by quality of the resulting excess supply. The net union premium
was estimated in Section 1 by relating changes in wages to changes in union status
of the saute worker in longitudinal panels (NLS and :11D) .InSection 2, two cross—
section wage level regressions, a "prospective" and "retrospective1' permit more
direct observation of selectivity in hiring. Over ahalf of the cross—section
differitialof over 20% for the 'same" (standardized) worker is a net union rent and
much of the rest reflects a quality adjustment in hiring, as measured by wages.
This conclusion was less reliable for older workers.—43—
Thenext step (Section 3)was toascertainwhether the net: unionwagepremium
is responsible, together with other advantagessecuredbythe union such as Lringes
andseniority rules, for the lesser turnover, especially quit of unionworkers.
The answer is positive: the reduction in quit depends on the size of the net
wage premium in an individual analysis, and is also positively related to the
gross, cross—section wage differentials within groups of workers,alassifi.ed by
location and occupation, though not by industry. Frfnges and seniority rules,
or-other union advantages did not explicitly enter this analysis hut they are
likely to be embodied in the union memnk:sbip variable,
inSection 4, it is hypothesizedthai: the jneisjt:jon of rer fixed I abor
costs (such as fringes) helps to deter employers from preferein; r ducttons Lu
hours to reductions in men, and it he)ns to stabi lie enpioyuont in the face
fluctuating demand,by a more froquant use of overtime and of teip car layoffs in the
union sector. This hypothesis links the size of fringe benefits to th' union
wage gain. An analysis of firms in 7) industries confirms this link.
Section 5 explored the consequence: of union pressure on the tenure pro file
of wages by the rather rigid linking of u e levels toseniori.t:y in the lob. The
consequently reduced incentives for wwlvr in\'estrnen ir qeneua I (-ransfer-ai].')
training, even if no such reduction neSs fo apply to specifi; tr ni;, is con-
sistent with observed flatter exper:isn::n (or aqe) profile of'agesof union workers.
In sum, total training is likely to be less frequent in union firm; an this is
confirmed by direct responses in survey r'porLs.References
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H2 =.43(a) Wage Gains (%) of
Table A3
































13.1 (2.6) 5.5( .4)
10.1 (1.6) —8.1 (.4)
—23.6 (4.4) —9.4 (.6)
—37.0 (6.7) —16.7 (.6)
11.4 (2.0) 10.6 C.5)
3.0( .6 3.8C .6)
6.0 (2.0) —1.9C .4)
2.3C .6)—12.0 (1.7)
(b)Wage Gain of Movers, by Union Status and by Indust _______
(B=movedbetween industries; W =movedwithin industries)
13.4 (2.9) 2.4C .1)
5.6(1.7) 2.3C 0













































Wage Gains in MID








































































































(a) Mobility Rate Regression, MID, Cross-section pooled
—.050 (7.3) —.015 (4.8)
—.048 (7.0) —.031 (9.9)
.0004 (3.0) .0002(1.2)
—.092 (12.8) —.050 (15.1)
.00]. ( .3) —.001 (.2)
—.454 (9.2) —.421 (18.5)
—.093 (2.5) —.042 (2.6)
R2 =.62 R2 =.55


















































Estimates of Group Wage Differentials, MID, Pooled
I. A category was excluded if the number of union observations in it was less
than 20 in the full sample.
The coefflicients reported below represent the percent union differential
for each category. The dependent variable islogdefalted average hourly
earnings. No intercept was used so that levels rather than contrasts could
be read for the group dummies (not reported here).
(1) The first set of dinmies refers to detailed industries:
PARAMETER
VARIABLE ESTIMATE T RATIO
11301 0.192876 2.6447 mining and extraction
11302 0.030812 o,8054 metal industries (manuf.)
11303 —0.027250 -0.9070 machinery, mci. electric (manuf.)
11304 0.098406 3.2413 motor vehicles, other transportation equipment (manUf.)
11305 0.120014 3.4501 other durables (mantif.)
11306 0.117478 2.5718 food and kindred products (manuf.)
11307 0.281642 4.1110 textiles, apparel, shoes (manuf.)
11308 0.028735 0.3106 paper and allied products (manuf.)
11309 —0.110420 —2.5741 chemical, allied products (manuf.)
11310 0.349179 12.4312 construction
1131]. 0.130612 3.9211 transportation
11312 0.084606 1,4231 communication
11313 0.168903 3.5534 other public utilities
11514 0.273232 7.1365 retail trade
11315 —0.043016 —0.8688 wholesale trade
1U16 0.110787 1.2200 repair service
11317 0.142907 1.4794 personal services
11318 0.184840 2.7868 printing, publishing, allied services
11319 —0,073909 -0.9493 medical and dental and health services, public or private
11120 0.136501 3,9973 educational services, public or private
11321 0.219599 2.7867 professional and related services other than medical
or dental

























































































































































R—SQUARE 0.0655 NOTE: NOfl1TEBCEPTTERM IS USED.
4(3) The third set of dummies refers to aggregate occupations
cross—classified by aggregate industries:
VARIABLE
PAR AIiETER




















craftstaen, foremen and kindred
operatives and kindred
laborers and service workers
Non—dura bies inanufactu ring







craftsmen, foremen and kindred
operativesüdkiñdred








4.0230 professional or managerial
13.8224 craftsmen, foremen and kindred




























Transportation, communication, public utilities
101114 0.035351 0.5346 professional or managerial
10U15—0.00629608 —0.0954 clerical and sales
101116 0.184263 4.2493 craftsmen, foremen and kindred
101117 0.231402 4.0272 ope:atives and kindred




laborers and service workers
Educational services, private or public
-. -
101123 0. 171116 4.3852 professional or managerial
Those and all other services
101124 0.068333 238'46 alloccupational categories, except 1023
or educational services; NA whether other
2.3907 professional or managerial
1.9485 clerical and sales
3.7062 craftsmen, foremen and kindredTable A7
Determinants of In-Firm Training on Current Job
*Inverseof one plus state wage differential, multiplied by coverage















.013 (7.2) .039 (6.0)
.009 (1.4) .015 (1.1)
—.001 ( .9)—.0005 ( .5)
.055
—.005
(3.4)\
(2.1)"
.018 (1.1)
-.044 (1.3)
.014 ( .7)
—.196 (2.7)
R2 =.06
— .0007
—.001
—.001
—.005
.00
.014
.005
—.164
—.220
.01)
0)
0)
(.7
( .3
.1
1
(26.8)
( 2.4)
=.08